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I. Introduction
Agricultural water supplies historically have been the primary
source from which water is transferred for new uses. In many
western states, transfers out of agriculture to municipal and
industrial uses have been occurring for decades. (Brown et al. 1982.
Saliba and Bush, 1987, Shupe et al, 1989)
Individual irrigators and irrigation districts hold substantial
senior water rights in the major river systems and groundwater
basins of the West. These senior rights were developed under
federally sponsored projects to help settle the West and through local
cooperative efforts among neighboring irrigators. The early
contributions of private water development are often overlooked as
current policy discussion revolves around the use and transfer of
Colby is Associate Professor of Agricultural and Resource
Economics at the University of Arizona. Her research, teaching and
consulting focus on the economics of water reallocation in the
western states and the value of water in alternative uses.
water in Bureau of Reclamation projects. By 1910 over 13 million
acres of land were being irrigated through privately developed water
supplies (Anderson, 1983). Federal assistance came in the 20th
century to undertake larger, more capital-intensive projects than
private entrepreneurs were able to undertake. Approximately 20
percent of the irrigation water used in the West now comes from
federal water projects and the remaining proportion is provided by
private, local and state water resource development. (Wahl, 1989).
The vast pool of senior water supplies developed to irrigate the
arid West is a valuable regional asset. Senior water rights are highly
prized not only by the farmers who hold them, but also by cities and
industries seeking to insulate themselves against the drought year
shortfalls to which more junior water holdings are vulnerable.
Acquisition of senior rights to support urban growth and for drought
protection has been the key force behind water transfers, and these
factors will continue to be important in the 1990s. In addition,
environmental and recreational demands for water are becoming an
important consideration in many areas. Over the next decade, Indian
water rights settlements are also likely to influence the movement of
water from agriculture to other uses.
Economic factors affect how readily, and at what price,
farmers will agree to sell or lease water they have used for agricultural
purposes. Legal factors affect the hurdles that must be overcome in
getting state approval for transfers and in addressing questions raised
by other water users in the hydrologic areas affected by transfers.
Political and legal factors also affect the degree to which rural
communities and environmental interests can affect the outcome of a
transfer proposal. Federal and state policies related to agriculture,
water quality and the environment also play a key role in determining
how much agricultural water is likely to be available for other uses,
and at what costs to the new users. This paper outlines and analyzes
the key factors that will affect the cost and quantity of water
transferred out of western irrigated agriculture in the 1990s.
II. An Overview of Agriculture's Role in Water Transfers
A. Water Markets—What Are They and Why Do They Develop?
The term 'Water markets," as used in this discussion, refers to
transactions which satisfy three conditions:
I. Water's value is recognized as distinct from the value of land
and improvements. Water is bought and sold for its own sake,
not merely as an incidental part of a land transfer.
2. Buyers and sellers agree to reallocation voluntarily.
3. Prices are negotiable by the buyer and seller, not constrained to
be "not for profit" or "at cost."
Transfers may include sale or lease of fee titles, water use
permits, conservancy district shares and project contract rights;
conditional water leases for drought year use; exchanges of water
rights with varying priority dates and arrangements to use conserved
water. Water resources which have been involved in market
transactions include groundwater, native and imported surface water,
artificially recharged and recovered water, effluent and conserved
water
The motivating force behind market transfers is the perception
that economic gains may be captured by transferring water to a
location or purpose of use in which it generates higher net returns
than under existing use patterns. Three conditions must be satisfied
for a buyer and seller to consummate a water transfer:
1. The seller must receive a price offer that equals or exceeds the
economic benefits sacrificed in transferring water. A farmer,
for instance, must consider the net returns to water in
irrigation, any decreases in the value of land, improvements
and equipment due to reduced water availability and expected
appreciation in the value of the water right over time.
2. The buyer must expect the economic returns from the water
right purchase (which may be contributions to a manufacturing
process, investment returns or profits from real estate
development) to exceed the costs associated with thepurchase.
3. The buyer must view market acquisition of water lights asan
economically attractive method of obtaining water. relative to
other possibilities--such as new supply development
contracting with an existing water service organization.
Recent studies in the western states suggest that more water
transfers occurred, and in more areas, in the 1980s than occurred in
the 1970s or 1960s. Data on applications filed for water rights
transfers in seventeen western states over the years 1963 to 1982
indicate a substantial increase in transfer applications over that
twenty year period (Higginson-Barnett, 1984). Given the conditions
necessary for a market transaction, there are several reasons why the
level of market activity may be increasing.
The southwestern states have experienced rapid rates of
population and economic growth since the Second World War.
Concurrent with this growth, there has also been significant
structural change in regional economies. While irrigated agriculture
remains the predominant water use in the Southwest, the
nonagricultural sectors of the economy now employ all but a fraction
of the work force and generate a large proportion of income. The
construction, manufacturing, service, and government sectors of the
economy are competing successfully for land and water resources
once devoted to agriculture. These economic trends make it more
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probable that the first condition for a market transaction will be
satisfied that there are net benefits to be gained in transferring water
to a new use.
Historically, water for new users in the West has been provided
through appropriating water rights and through constructing water
development projects. The costs of such projects were subsidized
heavily by the federal government. During this era, there was little
incentive to purchase water rights from existing users. Appropriation
of unclaimed water and inexpensive supply development were
attractive alternatives to market transfers. However, surface water
supplies are now fully appropriated in many areas and some states
have set limits on groundwater pumping, so that it is no longer an
inexpensive and easy matter to appropriate new water rights. Local
supply development costs have risen for several reasons: the best
reservoir sites have already been used, environmental considerations
and conflicting water claims result in project delays and costly impact
studies, and the federal government is less willing to subsidize project
costs. Together, these changes make it more likely that the second
condition for a market transaction will be satisfied—that market
transfers will be an attractive means of obtaining water supplies
relative to other alternatives.
While market transactions are primarily a response to
economic incentives, legal arrangements play a central role in market
development. State policies define the conditions under which
transfers may occur and affect the transaction costs incurred by
market participants in transferring water. Transaction costs are
incurred in searching for trading partners; in identifying legal and
hydrologic characteristics of water rights (priority date, return flow
obligations, etc.); in negotiating price and other terms of transfer: in
dealing with third parties who object to the proposed transfer; and in
satisfying applicable state and federal laws. Transaction costs
influence the profitability of a given transfer and can, therefore, affect
the level of market activity. (Colby et al, 1989b)
B. An Overview of Previous Transfers Out of Agriculture
Several regional markets which have had a series of transfers
out of agriculture are briefly described. Prices are reported here in
1989 dollar values. Unless otherwise noted, transactions described
are sales rather than leases. Descriptions of transfers refer to the
quantity of water that may be diverted for use by the buyer, in acre
feet per year of long term average yield. This quantity usually differs
from the diversion right held by the seller because most states allow
only the consumptive use portion of the right to be transferred.
Truckee Basin, Nevada
The Truckee River flows from Lake Tahoe in the Sierra Nevada 	 cm
Mountains into Pyramid Lake in the northwest Nevada desert. The
Carson River flows just south of the Truckee Basin. Water from both
river systems is used in the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District
(TCM). located downstream and about 50 miles to the east of the
cities of Reno and Sparks, which form the core of a rapidly expanding
regional population. (Saliba and Bush, 1987)
The majority of water used in the area is primary flow and
storage from the Truckee and Carson Rivers. Rights to the Truckee
River were adjudicated under the On Ditch Decree of 1944. The
Carson River was adjudicated under the Alpine Decree of 1980.
(United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co. et al., Final Decree, U.S. District
Court Nevada Equity No. A-3, 1944 (D. Nev. 1944) . U.S. v. Alpine
Land and Reservoir Co. et al., Nos. 87-1746 and 87-1747).
Reno and Sparks receive water from Sierra Pacific Power
Company, a privately owned utility. Irrigators are supplied with
Truckee River water delivered by private ditch companies. Lake
Tahoe, Stampede Reservoir and Boca Reservoir serve as area-wide
regulatory and storage facilities for the Truckee River.
About 50,000 acre feet of Truckee River surface water rights
are used by Sierra Pacific to serve urban areas and 300,000 are used
for irrigation annually. Up to 300,000 acre feet per year of Truckee
River water flows into Pyramid Lake. The Pyramid Lake Indian
Reservation and the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District are the major
Truckee River water users located outside the Reno-Sparks area.
Indian, irrigators, and municipal users of the Truckee River have
been locked in continuing litigation over water resources since the
early twentieth century. Growth of the Reno-Sparks area has brought
increasing numbers of nonagricultural enterprises with a high
willingness-to-pay for water. Institutional barriers have precluded the
transfer of water rights from TCID to the Reno-Sparks area, forcing
these communities to support growth by water resources elsewhere.
Until the late 1970s, almost all transfers of surface water rights
involved the sale of irrigation rights to Sierra Pacific. In the late
1970's, Sierra Pacific became aware that it was not acquiring water
rights fast enough to keep up with the growing demand for its
services. Further, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe succeeded in having
a major storage reservoir designated for fisheries enhancement,
rather than municipal supply. Increasing awareness of the scarcity of
water has driven prices up more than twenty-fold since 1979 and has
brought many new actors into the market. In the late 1980s, prices in
this area were around $2,000 per acre foot.
In addition to the active acquisition of irrigated land and water
rights to support urban growth water transfers are occurring to
enhance wetlands and wildlife habitat. In 1990, the Nevada State
Engineer approved several transfers of water out of irrigation to
provide increased flows into the Stillwater Wildlife Management Area,
a key link on the Pacific flyway for migratory birds. Transfers for
environmental purposes will be an important market force here in the
1990s, as private and public entities continue to acquire water for
wildlife and wetland enhancement. (Water Market Update, 1989-90)
Lower Sevier Basin. Utah
The Sevier River flows north from the high plateaus of
southwestern Utah, terminating in the Sevier Desert one hundred and
forty miles southwest of Salt Lake City. Four mutual stock irrigation
companies -- Delta, Melville, Abraham and Desert (the DMAD
companies), control virtually all surface flow rights on the lower
stretch of the river. Until recently, water delivered by DMA]) was
used exclusively for irrigation. In 1980, the Intermountain Power
Project (IPP) bought twenty percent of DMA]) company stocks,
thousands of acre feet of privately held groundwater rights, and eighty
percent of the water stock in another ditch company upstream of
DMA]). The total package of water rights, with a yield of 45,000 acre
feet per year, cost approximately $2,550 per acre foot. The water was
acquired for cooling a new coal-fired power plant. The projected size
of the power plant operation was reduced after IPP purchased the
water rights. Consequently, about half the water rights owned by IPP
are not needed for power plant operations and are rented back to
irrigators.
Sales of mutual water company stocks and groundwater rights
purchases have generated prices ranging from $320 to over $2,550
per acre foot since 1978. Prices rose sharply in the period preceding
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and immediately after IPP's purchases in 1980, but leveled off to
between $320 and $530 per acre foot in 1984 and 1985.
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, Colorado
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD)
lies north of Denver and east of the Rocky Mountains. Urban centers
include Boulder, Fort Collins, Loveland, Longmont and Greeley.
Irrigated agriculture traditionally has been the major water use in the
area, but growing demand by industry, power generation, and rapidly
expanding cities characterizes a significant shift in water use. Urban
growth and land acquisition since the late 1950s have converted
increasing quantities of irrigation water rights to municipal uses.
Cities obtain water rights through purchase of water company stock,
dedication of water rights by developers in exchange for water service,
and wholesale acquisition of water service organizations, especially
irrigation companies whose service areas became urbanized.
The Colorado-Big Thompson (C-BT) project is the largest single
supplier in the area, delivering an average of 225,000 acre feet of
water annually from mountain reservoirs on the west slope of the
continental divide to the NCWCD on the eastern slope. Although the
C-BT project originally was developed as a supplementary water
supply for irrigation, approximately one-third of C-BT allotments now
are in municipal or industrial ownership. C-BT water is used to
offset fluctuations in natural surface water flows on the eastern
slopes. C-BT annual releases may range from 155,000 to 310.000
acre feet.
Water rights transfers in Colorado must be approved by a state
water court, but this procedure generally is unnecessary when shares
in a water district are transferred within that districts service area.
The larger the company service area, the larger the area over which
the water may be marketed without water court proceedings. The
high value attached to C-BT water lies in the fact that the project
functions as a mutual stock water company, with the largest service
area of any such organization in Colorado. Water rights controlled by
the Colorado Big Thompson project (represented by shares, or
"units," each one entitling the holder to 1/310,000 of the water
delivered by the project in a given year) may be used or transferred
anywhere within the NCWCD. The market price of a unit of C-BT
water serves as a benchmark against which all other water rights and
water rights prices in northeastern Colorado are evaluated. Real
prices rose steadily through the 1960s and 1970s peaking at about
63,800 per acre foot (in 1989 dollars, assuming a long term average
yield of 0.75 acre feet per unit) in 1980. Prices dropped sharply in
the 1980s and stood at about $1,600 per acre foot in early 1990.
Southern Arizona
In Arizona, several distinct types of agricultural water holdings
have been purchased by urban interests in the Tucson and Phoenix
Active Management Areas (AMAs). AMAs were designated in the 1980
Groundwater Management Act as areas in which groundwater use is
closely regulated in order to reduce groundwater overdraft. (A.R.S.
45 Sec. 461-577)
No irrigation rights in Arizona can be purchased without
purchase of the land to which they are appurtenant. Purchasers of
irrigated farmland located within an AMA may convert the
groundwater rights on the land to "Type I" nonirrigation groundwater
rights. Type I rights are limited to a maximum rate of withdrawal of
three acre feet per irrigated acre per year, or the quantity which had
been used for irrigation , whichever is less. There are no specific
quantity limitations on groundwater pumped from lands located
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outside of AMA's. Pumping from outside of AMA's is limited only to
quantities of water that can be put to 'beneficial use."
Within the Tucson AMA, the market for Type I rights is
dominated by the city of Tucson. Tucson has been purchasing and
retiring irrigated farmland in the neighboring Avra Valley since the
early 1970s. By the end of 1986 over 20,000 acres of land had been
acquired, with an annual total exportable yield of approximately
55,000 acre feet.
Numerous purchases of water rights and farmland have
occurred in the Pinal and Phoenix AMA's. In 1985 the city of Mesa,
located in the Phoenix AMA, purchased over 11,000 acres of irrigated
farmland, located in the Pinal AMA to obtain about 30,000 acre feet.
Average prices paid per acre foot were about $1,100 per acre foot. In
1985, a Phoenix-area investment group purchased a farm in the
Phoenix AMA with 2,240 irrigated acres. The irrigation water rights
are convertible to municipal uses with a yield of 6,180 acre feet per
year. The purchase price averaged slightly under $1,400 per acre
foot. In 1986. the same investment group purchased another farm in
the Phoenix AMA with 6,070 irrigated acres and a yield of 15,340 acre
feet in Type I nonirrigation rights, for approximately $1,100 per acre
foot. These purchases have given rise to numerous concerns about -
the local economic impact of farmland sales. Of primary concern are
the effects of farmland retirement on the local and county tax base,
secondary impacts of reduced farming activity on other local
businesses, and the loss of water rights for future economic
development.
Numerous other purchases of groundwater and surface water
rights have taken place in Arizona outside of the Active Management
Areas, mostly in La Paz County in western Arizona. In 1984 the city
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of Scottsdale purchased the8,400 acre Planet Ranch. with an
estimated yield of 13,500 acre feet of surface water rights, for about
$950 per acre foot. The city hopes to transport water from out of the
Bill Williams River to the CAP aqueduct, which would then carry the
water to Scottsdale. The Crowder-Weiser Ranch was purchased by a
real estate development company in 1985 to support projects in the
Phoenix Area. The total yield of transportable water tights from the
Crowder-Weiser Ranch is estimated to be 51,140 acre feet of
groundwater per year. In 1986, the city of Phoenix purchased 16,000
acres in the McMullen Valley of eastern La Paz County, for slightly
over $32 million (in 1989 dollars). The city estimates that between
six and seven million acre feet of recoverable groundwater are in
storage in the aquifer underlying the lands.
Most of these 'Water ranch" acquisitions lie outside any Active
Management Area and so, legally the new owners are free to pump as
much as they want, so long as the water is being put to 'beneficial
use." However, groundwater exporters can be held liable to pay
damages to local water users who can demonstrate that the export of
the water is causing them harm. (A.R.S. 45-544 and -545)
Gila-San Francisco Basin, New Mexico
The Gila and San Francisco Rivers drain the southwestern
corner of New Mexico. The Gila-San Francisco Basin is sparsely
populated, but Silver City, a town of about 20,000 people, is located
nearby. The Gila-San Francisco Basin has been closed to additional
appropriations since the 1960s. New groundwater wells may still be
developed, however, by converting a surface water right to a
groundwater right and changing the point of diversion to the desired
well location. Since the 1960s, as changes in land use have created
demands for water distant from old irrigation ditches, many surface
rTh
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water rights have been retired and exchanged for groundwater rights.
(Saliba and Bush, 1987)
Rights to the Gila and San Francisco river systems were
adjudicated in the early and mid-1960s as a result of Arizona v. 
California. Approximately 30,000 acre feet of Gila and San Francisco
River water may be used in New Mexico's Gila-San Francisco Basin.
Until the mid-1960s, agriculture was the major user of water in
the Gila-San Francisco Basin. The pattern of water use changed
substantially in 1968, when Phelps Dodge acquired approximately
two thirds of all the water rights appurtenant to lands in the Gila
portion of the basin. Other nonagricultural commercial and
household water users have since entered the market to acquire water
rights. Water rights purchases by area mines have constituted the
largest volumes of water transferred over the past fifteen years,
though they represent only a small number of transactions. Most
transactions took place during the 1970s and 1980s and involved
small quantities of water rights, frequently involving an acre foot of
water or less. Since all outdoor water use requires a water right (even
domestic gardens and lawns), there is an active market for small
quantities of water to support residential development. Also. the
town of Silver City acquires water rights from irrigators in this basin.
which it pipes over the Continental Divide for municipal uses. Prices
ranged between $1,600 and $1,700 per acre foot in 1970s and then
rose sharply to around $3,200 an acre foot in 1979. Prices declined
again in the 1980s to around $1,800 per acre foot. In 1990, water
demand by new residential development and renewed mining activity
is pushing prices back up to around $3,000 per acre foot.
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Comparison Of Prices Across Market Areas
Water rights prices are a function of the interaction between
demand and supply-side forces in any given market area. Demand
side forces reflect expansion and contraction of water-using activities.
which in turn depend on the vitality of the regional economy, price
levels for energy, minerals and agricultural commodities, population
and income trends and other factors. Supply-side forces reflect
changes in water availability and in the costs of pumping
groundwater, developing new surface water supplies, contracting for
public project water and pursuing other alternatives to market
acquisition of water rights. Differing demand side forces were
dominant in the study areas over various periods of time—energy
development in the Lower Sevier Basin in the late 1970s, rapid
urbanization in Central Arizona and Colorado's front range during the
1960s and 1970s and mining expansion in the Gila-San Francisco
Basin during the 1960s and 1970s. On the supply-side, Arizona.
Colorado and Utah water prices are affected by new water supplies
from the Central Arizona Project, the Windy Gap Project, and the
Central Utah Project, respectively. Anticipation of new water supplies
can decrease incentives to bid water away from existing rights
holders, especially if the new water is federally subsidized.
Shifts in demand for water rights and new perceptions
regarding water scarcity led to rapid price increases in the
Northeastern Colorado and Truckee Carson market areas. The
Impact of a large new water buyer can be observed in Utah as prices
increased sharply when Intermountain Power Project entered the
Lower Sevier Basin market in the late-1970s. Prices in the Gila-San
Francisco Basin, which had been stable for a number of years, took a
sudden turn upwards in the late-1970s when the Exxon Corporation
began to acquire water rights for its new mining operation.
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It is instructive to consider not only what forces drive water
rights prices up, but also what forces allow them to fall. Water rights
prices in northeastern Colorado fell in the 1980s at least partially in
response to the impending completion of the Windy Gap Project,
declining interest rates, and a faltering farm economy. In addition,
some observers believe that cities began to recognize they had
acquired water rights to meet foreseeable needs, and that continued
acquisition of agricultural water rights might have undesirable effects
on the regional economy and on the maintenance of attractive
agricultural greenbelts around urban communities. In Utah, the
scaling back of the IPP to one-half its planned size was followed by a
drop in prices. The stabilization of water rights prices in Nevada's
Truckee Meadows, following price escalation in the early 1980s, may
be a signal that panic buying of water rights has slowed since private
and government organizations agreed upon a system to facilitate an
orderly transition of water rights from agricultural to municipal use.
III. The Costs Of Transferring Water Out Of Agriculture
An organization seeking to transfer water out of agriculture has
a number of costs to consider. Negotiating a price acceptable to the
current water right holder; an irrigator, ditch company or irrigation
district, is only one of many possible expenses. Others may include
legal fees, fees paid to the state administrative agency, hydrologic and
engineering studies, compensation to other water users who may be
Impaired, and mitigation of environmental impacts.
A. What Affects The Prices Farmers Are Willing To Accept?
How much an irrigator can reasonably accept for water rights
depends on several factors:
1. The value of water in irrigation, which in turn depends on
both crop revenues and production costs.
Crop revenues are a function of crop prices, and are also
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heavily influenced by federal commodity programs. Federal
crop price support programs make farm revenues much higher
than they would be otherwise. These additional receipts make
water more valuable to the farmer and thus make it more
expensive to bid water out of agriculture.
Production costs have many components. Those most
relevant for this discussion are the costs of irrigation water and
of energy. Increases in the cost of irrigation water from federal
projects will increase farmers' production costs and reduce the
net value of water in agriculture. The cost of energy is an
important component of the costs of irrigating -- both for
farmers who pump groundwater and farmers who use surface
water that must be pumped and conveyed from the river to
their fields. Renegotiation of energy contracts and declining
groundwater tables are two factors that can significantly affect
irrigation costs and thus influence farmers' incentives to sell or
lease their water.
2. Returns to farmland and assets without water
The economic benefits are farmers really giving up when they
sell water rights are the differences between economic returns
with and without water rights. If farmland is not transferred
when water is sold, the land may have value for dryland crop
production or grazing. Revenues, production costs and risks
will each be quite different in these alternative uses, if they are
practicable at all, than they were for irrigated crop production.
3. Expectations regarding future water values.
A key question in any irrigators mind involves the timing of a
water transfer. "Should I accept an offer for my water rights
this year or hold onto them hoping for higher prices?" The
value of water in farming is based on the expected present value
of the periodic receipts to which the water right entitles its
owner. Because the value of a water right is based on a stream
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of returns over time, it is sensitive to the lime rate of discount
and the expected change in relative price of water rights in the
future. Because the expectations that affect prices for water
rights are uncertain, willingness to sell is also influenced by the
risk-aversion of the farmer, and his willingness to hold on to
his water, taking the chance that the value of his right may fall
rather than rise.
4. Value of rural, agricultural lifestyle.
Sociological and economic studies indicate rural
households are not in farming primarily for its income
potential. In fact, many farmers are living on less income than
they could earn in other Jobs requiring comparable skills
because they value the independent, rural lifestyle that goes
with farming. Where the family has been established in farming
for several generations and has close cultural and historic ties
to the land, these lifestyle values may be quite important.
While not confined to religious or ethnic minorities, these
values are particularly evident in the pueblos and acequias of
the Rio Grande Valley and the Mormon farming communities of
the Great Basin.
All of the factors described play a role in determining the
price at which farmers may be willing to sell or lease water.
Where water rights are obviously quite valuable in non-
agricultural uses, farmers may hold out for prices that far
exceed the value of water in irrigation. For instance, Gardner
and Miller (1983) suggest that prices in Colorado's Front Range
peaked at values equal to the capitalized marginal demand for
water by municipal users in the late 1970s. As urban growth
accelerated, agricultural right holders believed that they each
had a high probability of being able to transfer their water
rights to municipal or industrial water users and were no
longer willing to sell at prices that reflected only water's value
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in irrigation. For a brief period of time, the value of the water
in urban uses was fully capitalized into market prices.
B. Satisfying State Transfer Approval Processes
After a satisfactory price has been negotiated, water buyers face
other costs in transferring water out of agriculture, including the
costs of satisfying state transfer processes. Most of the western
states have developed a process and criteria for evaluating
applications to change the place and/or purpose of use for water
rights. (Colby et al, 1989a) Although each state process has unique
features, they follow the general outline illustrated in Figure 1.
The procedures to gain approval for changes in the place or
purpose of use of water rights can be complicated. The complexity of
these procedures and uncertainty regarding whether a transfer will be
approved can prove costly for those seeking to transfer water and can 	 CM
discourage water reallocation. At the same time, formal approval
processes provide an arena in which concerns regarding proposed
transfers can be addressed. State statutes and case law provide
criteria by which transfers are evaluated. Foremost among the
transfer impacts considered is impairment of other water right
holders. In some states, transfer approval procedures provide a
forum where other concerns can be expressed -- such as impact on
local economies, recreation, fish and wildlife.
The complexity of each state's approval process affects the
amount of documentation and the need for professional consultants --
such as attorneys, engineers, and surveyors. Changes of use in
Colorado's most active water court divisions are often heavily
contested. The large number of Statements of Opposition typically
filed, the judicial nature of the procedures, and the de novo appeal
process are some of the factors which combine to make the Colorado
pm
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Figure 1. Change of Water Right Process
change application submitted
reviewed by state agency; modifications, supporting
materials are requested and submitted
change application filed
legal notice published
protests filed	 no protests filed
state agency rules on change application
approving, modifying, or denying the application
agency ruling appealed	 no appeal of ruling




judicial review of agency ruling
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system highly litigious. Therefore, attorneys and technical
consultants are typically retained at an early stage (Colby et al,
1989b). In contrast, the change of use process in Idaho and Wyoming
Is much less formal and complicated, partly because there has been
less controversy over water transfers in these states. In areas where
there is less competition for existing water sources, changes in use
generate less conflict among water users and legal counsel and
technical consultants are less frequently required.
There are often parties who believe their interests are adversely
affected by the proposed change in water use and who object to its
approval. Formal objections to change applications are allowed in all
of the western states. These objections are the primary means for
water rights holders to express their concerns and, in some states, for
the public interest to be protected. The most common basis for filing
a protest is impairment of existing water rights.
The requirements for standing to file a protest vary
considerably. In Montana, objections are limited to downstream
water rights holders. (M.C.A. Sec 85-2-308, 1987) Colorado opposers
need not be water rights holders, but statements of opposition can be
filed only o n the basis of injury to water rights. (C.R.S. Sec 37-92-
305(3), 1973) Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, and Arizona have no statutory
requirement that protestants must hold water rights, but in practice
give less credence to protestants who do not hold water rights that
could be affected by the change. (Colby et al, 1989a) A recent Utah
Supreme Court decision ruled that a protestant's claim may not be
dismissed simply because the protestant does not hold water rights,
and that any interested party has standing to protest a change in
water right application. (Bonham v. Morgan, No. 880143, 1989) New
Mexico statutes outline the basis on which protests can be filed.
(N.M.S. Sec 72-12-3(D), -7(A), 1985 and Groundwater Rules and
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Regs. Art. 2-8, 1966) These include: (1) impairment of the
protestant's own water rights, (2) detriment to the public welfare, or
(3) detriment to water conservation in the state.
Resolution of filed protests is often a critical and costly part of
the transfer process. Progress on the application can be significantly
delayed during this stage. Although there are some innovative
approaches to resolving disputes between applicants and protestants,
there are two primary alternatives: private resolution among the
parties or a hearing by the state agency. Informal private resolution
of conflicts between applicant and protestants is usually the least
expensive and swiftest alternative for resolving protests. A hearing by
the state agency is the alternative to failed negotiation.
Agency hearings can be as informal as a meeting between a
state agency staffperson, the applicant and protestants, or as formal
as a judicial proceeding in which all parties are represented by
counsel and witnesses are under oath. The location, formality, and
timeliness of the hearing can greatly affect the cost of the hearing for
applicants, protestants and the state.
Following the conclusion of the hearing, or a privately
negotiated resolution of objections to the proposed change, the state
agency must make a decision on the transfer application. Some
states' define specific criteria upon which the ruling must be based.
Substantive criteria for approval of a change in water use application
are desirable because they provide guidelines to potential applicants
and reduce uncertainty regarding approval. Non-impairment of other
water rights, and non-enlargement of the subject water rights are
statutory criteria in Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada and Wyoming.
Protection of the "public interest" or "public welfare" is a basis for
denying an application in Idaho and has been utilized in New Mexico.
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(Idaho Code Sec 42-203A, Supp. 1989, N.M.S. Sec. 72-5-7, 1985)
Bonham v. Morgan recently extended Utah criteria for applications to
appropriate water to water right change applications.
Parties who are dissatisfied with the decision of the state
agency may appeal the ruling. Typically, these appeals are handled by
the district or appellate levels of the state court system, but
sometimes they must be addressed within the administrative agency
prior to using the judicial system. The highest level of appeal for
state agency rulings is usually the state supreme court.
Political and economic pressures to incorporate broader
interests and more flexibility in water transfer processes are
intensifying. Environmental organizations increasingly scrutinize the
effects that water transfers may have on fish, wildlife, recreation, and
the riparian environment. In some states, these effects can be
considered when a transfer proposal is evaluated. In many states,
however, there is no provision in the administrative process for
addressing potential environmental concerns. Rural areas are
concerned that state water transfer procedures do not address the
economic and social impacts on the area from which water is
transferred. Rural interests in several states are lobbying for policies
that routinely consider area-of-origin concerns when a change in
water use application involves the export of water from one basin to
another.
C. The Role of Transactions Costs in Water Transfer Policy
The ability to impose transactions costs on those proposing to
transfer water represents power and voice in the water allocation
process. Parties who can gain standing to formally object to a
transfer have the power to increase the costs that must be borne by
transfer proponents, provided that they themselves are also willing to
21
expend time and money. Water transfers are generally undertaken for
economic gain, based on the perception that water supplies will
generate higher returns in their new use than in their former use.
The power to erode this expected gain through imposing transactions
costs gives bargaining power over the concitions of the transfer and
an entree' into the decision process.
It is not surprising that the category of persons who have a
legal basis for filing protests has expanded as public interests in
water allocation has been more widely recognized and appreciation of
the diverse benefits generated by water resources has broadened.
(Colby, 1989a; Johnson and Dumars, 1989) The earliest. and still
the most common, basis for protesting a proposed transfer is
impairment of existing water rights, based on the notion that rights
must be secure, protected against arbitrary infringements, for water
users to make the long term investments and commitments necessary
to settle the West. Other concerns which provide a valid basis for
objecting to a transfer vary considerably among the western states.
These concerns include local economic impacts, impacts on
recreation, fish and wildlife, and impacts on water conservation.
Colby et al (1989a) and Johnson and Dumars (1990) summarize
recent changes in the criteria considered when evaluating a transfer.
A recently completed study provides some interesting
Information on the costs of satisfying state criteria and procedures in
four western states. These costs are one important consideration in
evaluating future transfers of water out of agriculture. Colby et al,
(1989b) found that, in many areas, the costs of going through transfer
approval procedures is insignificant compared to prices paid to
acquire water rights. However, for water transfers occurring in areas
where transfers tend to be controversial and heavily opposed the legal




30% of the cost of acquiring the rights. Unopposed transfer
applications were, or course, less costly for the applicant than those
which were opposed. The greatest expenses arose when public
interest issues were raised as a part of objections to the transfer. The
relative novelty of public interest provisions in western state water
transfer law means that state agencies have little experience in
interpreting and administering public interest criteria. For transfers
that were opposed, opponents usually incurred some legal costs and
in some cases with multiple protestants, the protestants cumulatively
spent as much as the applicants for the transfer. While the study
analyzed transfers in only four southwestern states (Colorado, Utah,
New Mexico and Nevada), the results provide some insights on the
importance of transactions costs in transferring water out of
agriculture.
IV. Innovative Transfer Arrangements
Innovative transfer arrangements promote efficient and flexible
water use, as do traditional purchases. but often have a less severe
impact on rural communities and riparian environments. Thus they
may incite fewer objections and be more easily negotiated. The
following paragraphs describe a number of different types of
voluntary transfers which can move water to new uses and provide
drought supplies for urban and environmental needs.
Dry year options and conditional lease-backs, negotiated in
anticipation of drought, are two ways to ensure that water quickly
could become flexible if it were needed elsewhere. The difference
between these two approaches is the degree of security and long-term
control over water provided by each. Under a drv year option
ownership of the water right remains with the original water user.
The new water user, who might a municipal water provider or a state
agency, enters into an agreement with an irrigator allowing them to
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use water under specific conditions. For water users who need highly
reliable supplies this type of arrangement provides a back-up source
of water for dry years. In one instance, a central Utah city paid a
nearby farmer $25,000 up front for a 25-year dry year option and
agreed to provide, in any year the option was exercised, $1,000 and
300 tons of hay to maintain the farmers livestock. The option was
exercised three out of the first 25 years the Option was in place
(Clyde, 1986)
Though promising, dry year options can be unattractive to
farmers who desire more certainty when planning their farming
operations. The following example illustrates this point. In 1987 the
Metropolitan Water District (MWD) of Southern California attempted
to negotiate a dry year option with the Palo Verde Irrigation District
(PVID). Under the proposed arrangement, MWD offered Palo Verde
farmers a payment up front at the time they register acreage in the
dry year option from irrigation and additional payments during years
the option would be exercised. (Water Market Update, 1987). MWD
expected to call that acreage into retirement once about every seven
years in order to firm up municipal supplies. Farmers rejected the
proposal for a number of reasons, including its effect on their ability
to make long-range farming plans. Under such arrangements,
farmers face substantial uncertainty in planning their crop rotations,
their marketing strategies, equipment leases, and purchases of
Inputs.
A number of other issues need to be addressed when dry-year
options are considered. One of these involves defining the conditions
under which the option will be exercised. Reservoir and stream flow
levels can be specified as a basis for activating the option.
Additionally. it is necessary to ensure that farmers be compensated
for lost crop revenues when the option is exercised, for disruption of
Th
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farm planning and land use patterns and for any production and
marketing expenses incurred prior to being notified that land would
be dried up for that season. The terms and timing for notification are
Important issues to irrigators.
Under conditional lease-backs, land and water are purchased
by the entity desiring long-term control of the water. most often a
municipality or an industry, and are leased back to the farmer so that
farming can continue except when the water is needed to replace
drought short falls. The new water right holder could be a state
agency, and the lease back conditioned on the need for water to
support instream flows for recreation, fish and wildlife during dry
seasons and years. Conditional lease-backs are attractive to growing
cities because they assure a supply of water that can be reserved
either during droughts or for water demand generated by new growth.
There have been several lease-back arrangements implemented
In Arizona. In 1985, the city of Mesa purchased 11.606 acres of
farmland in Pinal County, planning eventually to use the water in the
city's expanding service area. Meanwhile the city is leasing the land
back to farmers and the land continues to be irrigated. (Kolhoff,
1988). The city of Phoenix purchased 14,000 acres of farmland in
western Arizona's McMullen Valley in 1986. The city plans to retire
the land and transfer the associated groundwater to urban uses.
Phoenix is keeping the farmland in production, employing local
farmers and postponing some of the economic impacts of the eventual
retirement of that acreage.
Exchanges among water sources are one way to promote water
use flexibility and to encourage use of surface water in years it is
available, saving non-renewable groundwater supplies for times when
streathflow is low.
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In 1989, Metropolitan Water District and Arvin Edison Water
Storage District, an agricultural water provider in the southern San
Joaquin Valley, agreed on an innovative water exchange to firm up
MWD's dry year supplies. In wet years MWD will store unneeded
State Water Project entitlements in the aquifer underlying Arvin-
Edison. In dry years, the irrigators will pump the stored water to
Irrigate crops and allow MWD the use of about 100,000 acre-feet of
federal project water that would have otherwise been used for
Irrigation. The farmers benefit because the stored water raises the
groundwater level and reduces their pumping costs. MWD receives
reliable supplies that cushion it against drought. Before being
Implemented, the exchange must be approved by the California
Department of Water Resources and the Bureau of Reclamation.
(Quinn, 1989)
In a number of areas. po/icymakers are encouraging farmers to
use treated effluent to irrigate so that higher quality water supplies
normally used for irrigation can be available for uses requiring higher
quality water. For instance, farmers in the Tucson area receive
treated effluent from Municipal treatment plants and this enables
them to cut back on groundwater pumping. (Lieuwen, 1989)
Exchanging priority can help certain water users, especially
cities and industries, to secure highly reliable supplies in drought
years. Such exchanges of priority have substantial potential with
Indian reserved rights, since the priority date of most tribal rights
goes back to the date the reservation was established. There have
been some agreements to defer tribal seniority in drought years so
that junior right holders have more reliable water supplies. One
arrangement involves the Navajo Nation, which has a senior claim on
the San Juan River. In exchange for congressional approval of the
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project, the Nation agreed to defer its
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seniority during dry years and to share water shortages
proportionately with non-Indians. This gives downstream users in
the Rio Grande Basin, including the City of Albuquerque, more
reliable supplies during drought. (Back and Taylor, 1980).
Possibilities also exist for exchanging priorities in the Colorado
River Basin where several Indian tribes have very high priority rights
to the Colorado River. Phoenix area municipalities, the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California, and the city of San Diego all
have considered negotiating with tribes located along the Colorado
River to obtain more reliable dry year supplies. Discussions are still
in the early exploratory stages (Water Market Update, 1987-89).
Another policy approach that could allow irrigation water to
move to new uses while minimizing impacts on the area of origin,
involves incentives for water conservation, salvage and reduced
consumptive use. Most western states historically have taken a hard
line against new uses and transfer of conserved water, arguing that
the portions of a water right "salvaged" through conservation
measures become available to new or junior appropriators, rather
than to those taking the conserving action. California and Oregon are
exceptions, having passed statutes encouraging transfer of conserved
water. There are a number of steps a state can take to facilitate the
transfer of conserved water. A first step is to provide the statuary
incentive and authority by explicitly allowing transfer of conserved
water and by protecting water rights not being exercised due to
conservation from loss through forfeiture and abandonment
proceedings.
Even after enabling statutes are in place, a number of difficult
technical and hydrologic issues remain in determining the quantity of
salvaged water that actually can be transferred. 1987 Oregon
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legislation states that the only salvaged water that may be transferred
is that which in the absence of the conservation measure otherwise
would have been irretrievably lost to the system and thus unavailable
to other water users. (State of Oregon, Senate Bill 24, 1987) Capture
of substantial irretrievable losses probably will not come from
improvements in irrigation efficiency, however, since most salvaged
water previously re-entered the system as return flows. Transferrable
water could potentially come from switching from a higher to a lower
consumptive use crop. Other measures which decrease the amount
of water irretrievably lost through evaporation and deep percolation
include lining earthen canals, better field drainage, and improved on-
field water management. Allowing farmers who reduce consumptive
use, perhaps through new crop rotations, to use the additional water
on other land, or to sell or lease the water can provide strong
conservation incentives. Laws in the western states on use and
transfer of salvaged or conserved water vary considerably, with
protection of other right holders being the primary constraint on new
uses and transfers. (Colby, 1989a)
There are few examples to date of successful transfers of
conserved irrigation water. The city of Casper. Wyoming is paying for
canal lining on over 200 miles of the nearby Casper-Alcova Irrigation
District's conveyance system. This arrangement is expected to
provide the city with about 7,000 acre-feet of water per year, (Wahl,
1989). In California, MWD and Imperial Irrigation District have
reached a preliminary agreement after years of negotiation. MWD will
pay for conservation measures within the district that are intended to
salvage about 100,000 acre-feet per year, that can then be transferred
to MWD's service area. (Water Market Update, 1989) Interestingly,
both examples involve water provided under Bureau of Reclamation




Innovative transfer arrangements, structured to meet dry year
needs of growing cities, critical fisheries or environmentally sensitive
wetlands, can accomplish many of the objectives that outright
purchase of water rights accomplishes. Water becomes more flexible,
more responsive to changing needs and values, and yet is not
permanently removed from its original place and purpose of use. The
1990s will no doubt provide new examples of the advantages and
complexities of conditional water use contracts, exchanges of water
sources and water right priorities, and of transfers involving salvaged
and conserved water.
W. Summary
Agriculture will continue to be a key source of water for new
uses during the 1990s. The prices at which farmers are willing to sell
or lease their water will depend on crop prices, federal agricultural
commodity programs, pricing policies for federally supplied water
and the cost of energy. Transactions costs to satisfy transfer
procedures and criteria, and to resolve conflicts with third parties
who object to a proposed transfer will be an important component of
overall transfer costs. These transactions costs are likely to be higher
in the 1990s then previously, as a more diverse set of interests are
Influencing western water decisions and broader concerns must be
addressed when contemplating a transfer. Environmental,
recreational, rural community and tribal considerations each have an
Increased role in water policy and allocation. In many areas of the
West, the water that can be taken out of agriculture at low cost and
with little controversy has already been transferred. In the 1990s,
transfer arrangements that do not permanently dry up irrigated lands
and remove water from the area of origin will need to be pursued in
order to make agricultural water available for new uses. Agricultural
water 'supplies may represent the "deepest pool" in the West, but
tapping that pool will involve higher costs and more complex
negotiations with farmers and third parties than ever before.
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